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Bar Exam · MBE · § 3 Study guide

MBE bar exam subjects, section by section on NCBE's outline

Each figure on this page points to one of 9 documents; the latest reading of them was on Nov 19, 2026.

The Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) tests seven subjects, each with 25 scored questions. The subjects are Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law and Procedure, Evidence, Real Property and Torts, and NCBE's Subject Matter Outline divides each into categories with approximate shares. This guide takes them in that order: where the items in a subject concentrate, the point most fact patterns turn on, and the distinctions that are easiest to confuse. [1] [2]

Questions
200 175 scored
Time
6 h
Scale
About 40–200
[2] [3] [8]
This page, section by section 13
  1. § 1 How NCBE's outline is organized
  2. § 2 Civil Procedure: the forum first, then the federal rules
  3. § 3 Constitutional Law: who may act, and on what showing
  4. § 4 Contracts: the common law and Article 2 side by side
  5. § 5 Criminal Law and Procedure: mental states and police conduct
  6. § 6 Evidence: purpose of the offer decides the rule
  7. § 7 Real Property: five categories at equal weight
  8. § 8 Torts: negligence first, then the rest of the field
  9. § 9 Ways to prepare, by type of material
  10. § 10 The outline and the NextGen switch
  11. § 11 Two worked items per subject
  12. § 12 Overview, practice set, scoring and registration
  13. § 13 Questions about the subject list
§ 1

How NCBE's outline is organized

NCBE's outline lists the law each subject draws on, broken into numbered categories. It does not give a count per category; it states approximate shares, which the sections below repeat in words. Every subject carries 25 scored items on a form. Items are answered under generally accepted principles, with the federal civil and evidence rules for those two subjects and UCC Articles 1 and 2 inside Contracts.

Every section follows the same order: the share of the subject's items, the categories behind them, the point most fact patterns turn on, and distinctions that are easy to confuse. The quiz closing this page holds two worked items per subject.

Scored items per subject from NCBE's format page; the split inside each subject is in its section.

Share of the scored items: one square per area
  1. I Civil Procedure 25 scored items
  2. II Constitutional Law 25 scored items
  3. III Contracts 25 scored items
  4. IV Criminal Law and Procedure 25 scored items
  5. V Evidence 25 scored items
  6. VI Real Property 25 scored items
  7. VII Torts 25 scored items

MBE outline 2020 MBE format MBE map

§ 2

Civil Procedure: the forum first, then the federal rules

About two-thirds of the Civil Procedure items come from three outline categories: jurisdiction and venue, pretrial procedure, and motions. The remainder spreads over the law a federal court applies, jury trials, verdicts and judgments, and which orders can be appealed.

Jurisdiction and venue, one of those three categories, asks first whether a federal court may hear the case. For diversity, no plaintiff may share state citizenship with any defendant, citizenship is fixed when the suit is filed, and the amount in controversy has to exceed the statutory figure; a claim for exactly that figure falls short. A corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and of the state where its nerve center sits. Supplemental jurisdiction and removal sit on top of that analysis, and removal on diversity grounds is closed to a defendant who is a citizen of the forum state.

Points that are easy to blur

  • Erie: in a diversity case the court takes substantive law from the state, yet a federal rule squarely on point governs if it is valid under the Rules Enabling Act.
  • A defense of no personal jurisdiction, improper venue or bad service is lost if it is left out of the first Rule 12 motion or the answer; subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
  • A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict needs a motion made before the case went to the jury.
§ 3

Constitutional Law: who may act, and on what showing

About half of the Constitutional Law items deal with individual rights. The rest come from judicial review, the separation of powers, and federalism.

A rights claim is decided first by the standard of review. Strict scrutiny, for suspect classes and fundamental rights, puts the burden on the government to show the law is necessary to a compelling interest. Intermediate scrutiny, used for sex-based lines and for children born outside marriage, asks for a substantial relation to an important interest. Under rational basis the challenger carries the burden, and very few laws fail it.

Points that are easy to blur

  • Rights against government need state action; a purely private employer or club is outside the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • Standing needs a concrete injury that the challenged conduct produced and a ruling could fix; a taxpayer's general grievance does not qualify.
  • A state law that discriminates against out-of-state commerce faces near-fatal review under the dormant Commerce Clause, unless the state is buying or selling as a market participant.
  • A content-based limit on speech gets strict scrutiny, while a content-neutral rule on time, place and manner needs narrow tailoring and ample other channels.
§ 4

Contracts: the common law and Article 2 side by side

About half of the Contracts items come from formation and from performance, breach and discharge, and about a quarter of all of them rest on UCC Articles 1 and 2 rather than the common law. The outline also covers defenses to enforcement, what terms mean, remedies, and third-party rights.

The first sorting step is the governing law: a sale of goods goes to Article 2, a service or land deal to the common law, and a mixed contract to whichever its predominant purpose points to. The answer changes with that choice. A modification of a goods contract needs no new consideration if it is made in good faith, while under the common law the pre-existing duty rule usually blocks it.

Points that are easy to blur

  • The mailbox rule makes an acceptance effective when sent, but a rejection counts only on arrival, and an acceptance under an option contract counts only on arrival too.
  • The statute of frauds reaches promises that by their terms cannot be done within a year, land interests, suretyship, promises in consideration of marriage, an executor's own promise, and goods sales at or above the UCC price line.
  • Between merchants, an additional term in an acceptance joins the contract unless it materially alters it, the offer limited acceptance to its terms, or an objection follows.
§ 5

Criminal Law and Procedure: mental states and police conduct

About half of the Criminal Law and Procedure items deal with constitutional protection of the accused. The other half spreads over homicide, other crimes, inchoate crimes and parties, and general principles such as defenses.

On the substantive side, mental state does much of the work. At common law, voluntary intoxication can negate only a specific intent, and a mistake of fact helps against a general-intent charge only when it was reasonable. The Model Penal Code instead grades culpability as purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negligence. In homicide, a killing in the heat of adequate provocation, before a reasonable person would cool off, drops to voluntary manslaughter.

Points that are easy to blur

  • A warrantless search stands only under an exception: incident to a lawful arrest, the automobile exception on probable cause, plain view, valid consent, exigency, or a frisk on reasonable suspicion of danger.
  • Only a person whose own privacy interest was invaded can seek suppression; a visitor there briefly on business usually cannot.
  • Warnings are required for custodial interrogation, and a request for a lawyer stops questioning only when it is unambiguous.
  • A co-conspirator is liable for crimes by others that further the agreement and are foreseeable, unless an effective withdrawal came first.
§ 6

Evidence: purpose of the offer decides the rule

Of the Evidence items, roughly a quarter come from the presentation of evidence, a third from relevancy and its exclusions, a quarter from hearsay, and the rest from privileges and writings, all under the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Hearsay starts with the reason a statement is offered. An out-of-court statement used to prove what it asserts is hearsay; the same words offered to show their effect on a listener, as words that create legal rights, or to impeach, are not. Some statements the rules simply define as not hearsay: an opposing party's own statement, whether or not it was against interest when made, and certain prior statements of a witness who testifies at trial.

Points that are easy to blur

  • A statement against interest needs an unavailable declarant; an opposing party's statement does not.
  • Character evidence is not allowed to show action in conformity, but a criminal defendant may offer a pertinent trait, which lets the prosecution rebut; other acts can come in for a purpose such as identity or plan.
  • The best evidence rule, which asks for the writing itself, applies only when its contents are what a party is trying to prove.
  • A prior conviction offered to impeach follows Rule 609, which treats crimes of dishonesty differently from other felonies.
§ 7

Real Property: five categories at equal weight

Real Property items come about one-fifth from each of five categories: ownership, rights in land, real estate contracts, mortgages, and titles.

A title dispute comes down to a recording statute and the status of the later buyer. A notice statute protects a subsequent purchaser for value who took without notice; a race-notice statute adds that the purchaser must also record first; a pure race statute looks only at who recorded first. Someone who received the land as a gift is not a purchaser for value, and the shelter rule lets a buyer from a protected purchaser keep that protection.

Points that are easy to blur

  • The rule against perpetuities voids an interest that might vest too late on any possible chain of events, measured from lives in being when the interest was created; what actually happened later does not save it.
  • When one joint tenant sells their interest, the unities break for that interest, and the buyer holds it as a tenant in common.
  • An assignee of a lease is in privity of estate with the landlord and owes the rent directly; a subtenant is not and does not.
  • Foreclosure of a junior mortgage leaves a senior mortgage on the land.
§ 8

Torts: negligence first, then the rest of the field

About half of the Torts items deal with negligence. The rest cover intentional torts, strict and products liability, and other torts such as nuisance and defamation.

A negligence answer needs every element: a duty, a breach of the standard of care, actual cause, proximate cause, and harm. Proximate cause asks whether the type of harm was a foreseeable result of the risk that made the conduct careless, yet once a defendant is liable for some injury, the plaintiff's unusual fragility does not reduce the damages.

Points that are easy to blur

  • A product claim can rest on a manufacturing defect, a design defect, or an inadequate warning, and each has its own proof.
  • Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities covers only harm from the risk that made the activity dangerous.
  • A public figure who sues for defamation must prove the speaker knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded its falsity.
  • Respondeat superior makes an employer liable for an employee's torts committed in the course of the work, while hiring an independent contractor generally leaves that risk with the contractor.
§ 9

Ways to prepare, by type of material

Preparation material falls into a few kinds, and this page reviews none of them. NCBE publishes the subject outline and free sample questions, and sells study aids built from retired questions. Commercial bar review courses sell lectures, outlines and question banks, usually covering the written parts as well. Some law schools run bar support programs for their graduates. Free sets, such as this site's practice test, cover only the multiple-choice part.

§ 10

The outline and the NextGen switch

NCBE lists three more sittings, on February 24, 2027, July 28, 2027 and February 23, 2028, all on the outline the remaining MBEs follow. No newer outline is announced for them.

In jurisdictions that switched, the same seven subjects stay in scope, with additions noted on the overview. A first group of 10 jurisdictions made the move in July 2026, and the dates for the others are listed by jurisdiction on the bar exam page and in NCBE's table; check your board before relying on either.

§ 11

Two worked items per subject

Answers given: 0 of 14. Matching the key: 0.

I. Civ Pro · 25 scored items Question 1 of 14

A delivery truck bearing the logo "Smith Transport, Inc." struck a cyclist. Within the one-year limitations period, the cyclist sued "Smith Moving & Storage, Inc." in federal court, mistakenly believing that company operated the truck. The truck's actual owner, Smith Transport, Inc., is a separate corporation.

It received notice of the suit within 90 days after the complaint was filed and knew that, but for the cyclist's mistake, it would have been named. After the limitations period expired, the cyclist moved to amend to substitute Smith Transport, Inc. as the defendant.

Will the amendment relate back to the original complaint?

Pick a letter: the verdict follows the last option, and the reasoning under all four opens.

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. Rule 15(c)(1)(C) lets a change of party relate back when the new party, within the Rule 4(m) period, had notice and knew or should have known it would have been named but for a mistake about identity; Smith Transport had both.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Arising from the same occurrence is only the first condition; a new defendant also needs timely notice and knowledge of the mistake, so nothing about relation back is automatic.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Saving a timely claim against the right party after the period expires is the very purpose of relation back, so the expiration of the limitations period is not a bar in itself.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Notice plus a claim from the same occurrence would fall short without more, but Smith Transport also knew it was the intended defendant, so the missing knowledge element is present.
I. Civ Pro · 25 scored items Question 2 of 14 Preclusion

A driver sued another motorist in federal court for injuries from a collision. After a full trial, the jury found that the motorist had not been negligent, and judgment was entered for the motorist. A passenger in the driver's car, who had not participated in the first action in any way, then sued the motorist for her own injuries from the same collision. The motorist moved for summary judgment, arguing that the passenger is precluded from relitigating the motorist's negligence.

Should the motion be granted?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Nonmutual preclusion allows a newcomer to use a finding against someone who lost it after litigating; it never lets a party impose a finding on a person who did not take part.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Sharing the same accident does not bind a stranger to the first suit; preclusion runs only against those who were parties or closely aligned with them.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. The no-negligence finding was the reason the motorist won, so it was essential; the motion fails for a different reason, namely that the passenger was never a party.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. Due process forbids binding someone who never had a day in court; a passenger has no privity, representation, or control over the driver's suit, so the earlier finding cannot be used against her.
II. Con Law · 25 scored items Question 3 of 14

Congress enacted a statute making it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a public playground. The statute contains no requirement that the firearm have moved in interstate commerce. Congressional committee reports found that gun violence near playgrounds imposes substantial medical and insurance costs on the national economy. A man charged under the statute moved to dismiss, arguing that Congress lacked power to enact it.

Should the motion be granted?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Aggregation works for economic activity, but the Court refuses to pile up noneconomic local conduct to reach the substantial-effects threshold.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Congressional findings are considered but not controlling; the Court decides for itself whether the activity substantially affects commerce, as it did in Morrison despite extensive findings.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Congress may create federal crimes whenever it acts within an enumerated power, so the Tenth Amendment adds no separate bar; the defect is the lack of commerce power.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. Simple possession of a gun is not economic activity, and the statute has no jurisdictional element tying each case to commerce, so it exceeds the commerce power as in Lopez.
II. Con Law · 25 scored items Question 4 of 14

To induce investors to buy its bonds, a state agency promised in a bond covenant that revenues pledged to repay the bonds would not be diverted to subsidize commuter rail. Years later, facing traffic problems, the state repealed the covenant and diverted the revenues to rail subsidies, reducing the security of the bonds. Other means of funding rail were available. A bondholder sued.

Is the repeal constitutional?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. That limit covers promises not to exercise core regulatory power; a pledge about how bond revenue will be used is a financial commitment the state may make and must honor.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. When a state impairs its own financial promises, courts give little deference and ask whether the impairment was reasonable and necessary; other ways to fund rail existed, so it was not.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. The deferential reasonableness test fits laws adjusting private contracts; for the state's own obligations the impairment must also be necessary, and alternatives were available.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. The clause is not absolute; a substantial impairment can survive if it is reasonable and necessary to an important public purpose, so 'any' overstates the rule.
III. Contracts · 25 scored items Question 5 of 14

For three years, a florist sent a flower wholesaler an order every Monday, and the wholesaler always shipped the flowers without replying and billed the florist later. The wholesaler had never told the florist that it might decline an order. One Monday, the florist mailed its usual order.

The wholesaler received it but neither shipped nor replied. Relying on the usual practice, the florist did not order elsewhere and lost a weekend's sales. The florist sued the wholesaler for breach.

Is the wholesaler bound by a contract to fill that order?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Acceptance occurred when the wholesaler kept the order in silence; the later failure to ship is the breach, not a missing step in formation.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Reliance alone does not create a contract; the florist recovers because the wholesaler's silence was an acceptance, not because the florist changed position.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. The general rule has more than one exception, and a course of dealing that leads the offeror to expect silence to mean yes is one of them.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why D is right. Silence counts as acceptance when prior dealings make it reasonable for the offeree to give notice if it will not accept; three years of filling orders unannounced created that expectation.
III. Contracts · 25 scored items Question 6 of 14

On January 2, a merchant that sells industrial pumps sent a buyer a signed letter offering to sell 50 pumps at $400 each and stating, "This offer is irrevocable until September 30." The buyer gave no consideration for the promise. On May 15, the merchant sent a notice revoking the offer, which the buyer received the next day.

On June 1, the buyer mailed an acceptance. The merchant refused to deliver.

Is there a contract?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Only the party making the offer must be a merchant; the buyer's status does not matter to the firm-offer rule.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. An acceptance works only while the offer is still open, and this one had been revoked on May 16, before the June mailing.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. A merchant's signed firm offer binds without consideration only for the stated time up to three months; after early April the offer was revocable, and the May revocation ended it.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. The writing does not extend a firm offer without consideration past three months, so the promised date carried no binding force after early April.
IV. Crim Law & Pro · 25 scored items Question 7 of 14

A man sold a woman a ring for $5,000, telling her that the stone was a natural diamond. He knew that it was a laboratory-made cubic zirconia worth about $40. The woman paid and took the ring home. The jurisdiction defines crimes as at common law.

Of what crime can the man properly be convicted?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Embezzlement is the fraudulent conversion of property already lawfully held by the defendant, as by an employee; the man had no such lawful custody before the lie.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Larceny by trick applies when deception gets only possession while the owner keeps title; a buyer paying a price intends to transfer ownership of the money.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. False pretenses is obtaining title to property by a knowing false statement of fact; the woman meant to make the money his, so title, not mere possession, passed.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. The victim's failure to check is no defense; a knowing lie about a material fact that induces the transfer completes the crime even if a careful buyer would have caught it.
IV. Crim Law & Pro · 25 scored items Question 8 of 14 Burden

A state defines murder as an intentional killing. Its statute allows a defendant to reduce murder to manslaughter by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he acted under extreme emotional disturbance. At a murder trial, the judge instructs the jury on that basis. The defendant objects that the instruction unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to him.

Is the instruction constitutional?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. A presumption problem arises when an element such as malice is presumed; here no element is presumed, since the statute defines murder by intent alone and the state proves it.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. The state still proves every element of intentional killing beyond a reasonable doubt; extreme emotional disturbance is a separate mitigating matter, so the defendant may bear its burden (Patterson).
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. States may not shift the burden on an element of the offense, so the word 'any' goes too far; the instruction stands only because this defense is not an element.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Due process requires proof of the elements of the crime, not disproof of every mitigating claim, so a state may assign a true affirmative defense to the defendant.
V. Evidence · 25 scored items Question 9 of 14

A defendant was charged with murder and claimed self-defense, testifying that the victim lunged at him with a knife. The medical examiner testified that the victim had three stab wounds. The prosecutor then offered two autopsy photographs showing that all three wounds were in the victim's back. The defendant objected under Rule 403 that the photographs were gruesome.

Should the photographs be admitted?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. Rule 403 excludes only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value; photographs showing every wound in the back strongly rebut self-defense, so their value prevails.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Relevant and accurate evidence can still be excluded under Rule 403 when its unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its value, so this reason misstates the rule.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. No rule bars gruesome images; the court weighs them case by case, and their disturbing nature rarely tips the balance when they prove a contested point.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. The testimony gave only the number of wounds; the photographs show where they were, which is new and pivotal against the self-defense story, so they are not needlessly cumulative.
V. Evidence · 25 scored items Question 10 of 14 Privilege

A business owner, anticipating a large judgment, asked her lawyer how to transfer her assets to relatives so that the plaintiff could never collect. The lawyer, unaware of any wrongdoing, explained transfer procedures. The owner then made the transfers, which a court later found fraudulent.

In the plaintiff's suit to set aside the transfers, the plaintiff seeks the lawyer's testimony about the owner's request. The owner asserts the attorney-client privilege.

Should the testimony be compelled?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. The crime-fraud exception removes protection when the client consults a lawyer to carry out a planned crime or fraud; the client's purpose, not the lawyer's knowledge, controls.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. An innocent lawyer does not keep the privilege alive; the exception turns on why the client sought the advice.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. The privilege has exceptions, and using the lawyer's advice to commit a future fraud is one of them, so 'always' is wrong.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Financial subjects are fully protected when the advice is sought for a lawful purpose; the topic is not what defeats the privilege here.
VI. Real Property · 25 scored items Question 11 of 14

A homeowner was in severe financial distress and faced imminent foreclosure on his home, which was worth $200,000. An investor offered to pay off the $50,000 mortgage in exchange for an absolute deed to the property. The written agreement stated it was a "final and absolute sale."

However, the parties simultaneously signed a separate document allowing the homeowner to continue living in the home and to "repurchase" the property within two years by paying the investor $50,000 plus 10% interest. The homeowner defaulted on the repurchase payments, and the investor immediately filed an action to evict the homeowner, claiming absolute ownership.

Will the court likely grant the eviction?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Nothing in the papers gives the homeowner a life estate; permission to stay pending repurchase is evidence of a security arrangement, not a separate estate for life.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. Courts look past the label to the substance: a $50,000 advance on a $200,000 home, continued occupancy, and a buyback at principal plus interest mark the deed as security for a loan.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Once the deal is treated as a mortgage, the homeowner's default is a loan default; the investor's remedy is foreclosure with its protections, not eviction as an owner.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Paying a quarter of the home's value is a sign of a loan rather than a sale, and the amount paid does not turn a security transfer into absolute ownership.
VII. Torts · 25 scored items Question 12 of 14 Privilege

A wildfire was spreading toward a town. To create a firebreak, the town's fire chief ordered firefighters to bulldoze a barn on a farm in the fire's path. The fire was stopped at the break, saving hundreds of homes. The farmer sued the fire chief for the value of the barn.

Is the farmer likely to prevail?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. The duty to pay belongs to private necessity, where the actor protects his own interests; acting for the whole town makes the privilege complete.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Necessity applies precisely when there is no consent, so the absence of the farmer's permission does not defeat the privilege.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why C is right. Public necessity is a complete privilege: one who reasonably destroys property to save a community from imminent disaster owes the owner nothing in tort.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Whether or not the barn would have burned, the claim fails on the privilege of public necessity, not on a finding that the farmer suffered no loss.
VII. Torts · 25 scored items Question 13 of 14

A utility's high-voltage line, running through woods it maintained, broke during an ordinary summer thunderstorm with moderate winds and started a fire that burned several homes. Lines that are properly maintained do not ordinarily break in such storms. The homeowners had no evidence of what specifically went wrong. At the close of their case, the utility moved for judgment as a matter of law.

Should the court grant the motion?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why A is right. Res ipsa loquitur lets the jury infer negligence when the accident ordinarily does not happen without it and the instrumentality was in the defendant's control; both are shown, so the case goes to the jury.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why not B. Proof of a specific negligent act is not required when the circumstances themselves support an inference of negligence, which is the point of res ipsa loquitur.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. Power lines are in common use and their risks can be controlled with care, so courts do not treat them as abnormally dangerous; the claim proceeds on negligence.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. Properly maintained lines survive an ordinary storm like this one, so the weather does not explain the break; a jury may find that poor upkeep was the cause.
VI. Real Property · 25 scored items Question 14 of 14

Two brothers inherited a house as tenants in common, each with a one-half interest. One brother moved into the house and has lived there alone for six years, while the other brother lives in another state. The brother in possession never refused to let his brother use the house, and his brother never asked to do so. The brother living elsewhere now demands half of the house's fair rental value for the six years.

Is he likely to recover it?

  1. Reasoning for A
    Why not A. Cotenants are not fiduciaries simply because they share title, and no general fiduciary rule makes the occupying brother pay for using property he is entitled to possess.
  2. Reasoning for B
    Why B is right. Each tenant in common may occupy the whole, so one who lives there alone owes the others nothing for that use unless he excluded them or agreed to pay.
  3. Reasoning for C
    Why not C. A cotenant must share rents actually collected from outsiders, but his own occupancy produces no such rents, so the absent brother has no claim to a share of rental value.
  4. Reasoning for D
    Why not D. One cotenant's possession is not hostile to the others until he ousts them, and nothing here was a refusal of access, so no adverse possession period has run.
§ 12

Overview, practice set, scoring and registration

§ 13

Questions about the subject list

Which subject carries the most scored items?

None. Each has 25 scored items, so the seven subjects weigh the same; the differences are inside a subject, between its outline categories.

Is UCC Article 2 a separate subject?

No. It sits inside Contracts, where about a quarter of the items rest on UCC Articles 1 and 2.

Is criminal procedure tested apart from criminal law?

They form one subject. About half of its items concern constitutional protection of the accused, such as searches, confessions and the right to counsel.

Which edition of the outline applies?

NCBE names the MBE Subject Matter Outline, © 2020, the scope for every MBE through February 23, 2028.

The page’s documents, by number

9 · all read Nov 19, 2026